Véletlenszerű fluktuációk analízisén és hasznosításán alapuló mérési és titkosítási eljárások vizsgálata by HASH(0x7fe990b403c0)
UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND INFORMATICS 
DEPARTMENT OF TECHNICAL INFORMATICS 
Doctoral School of Computer Science 
 
Measurement and secure communication 
protocols based on the analysis and exploitation 
of random fluctuations  
 
Summary of the Ph.D. Thesis 
Written by: 
Gergely Vadai 
Supervisor: 
Dr. Zoltán Gingl 
Professor, Head of Department 
SZEGED 
2018 
 
  
1 
 
1 Introduction 
The paradigm shifts that have occured in the last century in natural sciences have 
affected our view of the natural laws’ generality. While the complexity and unknown 
boundary conditions of equations describing deterministic correlations were 
traditionally identified as the reason for the unpredictability of events, quantum 
physics showed us that some processes can be described appropiately using 
randomness only. 
Random signals – „noises” in the following – therefore aren’t necessarily 
hindrances to be eliminated, they can carry information about the examined system. 
One can concider for example the acoustic noise of a car engine or boiling water. 
While in technical areas the noise spectrum of circuit components tell a lot about 
their reliability, heart rate fluctuations provide useful information about our health. 
Noise can also play a constructive role – optimal functioning of some systems 
are made only possible by appropriate noise application. Good examples are the 
method of dithering used widely in microelectronics, image processing and 
telecommunication, or stochastic resonance – which received great attention in 
scientific circles. Such investigations and applications proved to be quite useful in 
various areas of numerous disciplines.  
During my doctoral studies at the Noise Research Group I’ve had the 
opportunity to get involved in many different multidisciplinary research projects. 
In my dissertation I present my results in areas which are examples of utilising 
noises in a constructive role or as an information source. The thesis points 
summarizing these results are based on the publications [1-6] as listed in Table 1 of 
Section 4 while publications [7-9] are connected to them indirectly. 
In noise research both the analytic description or modelling of processes and 
conclusions deduced from statistical analysis of experimental tests and 
measurement results take on a big role. The main results of my thesis confirm this 
well. For the theoretical proof and generalization of noise-based encryption 
protocols’ security I’ve used the mathematical tools of statistics and probability 
theory. Detecting trends in fluctuations of kayak paddlers’ movement signal 
however needed the appropriate measurement, processing, temporal and spectral 
analysis of signals and statistical evaluation of the metrics. Thus, my observations 
show both the usefulness of fluctuation analysis applied to a novel area and the 
effectiveness of the presented signal-to-noise ratio based method. 
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2 Unconditionally secure communication based on noise 
Current cryptographic protocols’ security is based on the assumption that the 
eavesdropper’s (Eve) resources are insufficient to break them within a reasonable 
amount of time with the currently known methods. This is called conditional 
security which makes the current protocols breakable with time and technological 
advancement – just like it has happened with numerous older methods which are 
obsolete today. 
A cryptographic protocol is said to be unconditionally secure from an 
information theory standpoint when Eve cannot derive any information about the 
plain text (apart from its length) – even in infinite time and with limitless 
computational resources. This is only possible with the key – which the encryption 
is based on and is considered critical information – being only used once, being 
completely random while being at least as long as the data to be encrypted [10]. This 
is called One-Time Pad (OTP). 
Thus, the key has to be previously agreed on between the parties or it should 
be securely exchanged, which brings us back to the original cryptographic problem. 
One possible solution to this problem is the use of key exchange (or key generating) 
protocols. The goal with these protocols instead of securely sharing previously 
prepared key bit sequences is the joint generation of the key bit sequences during 
the communication through the measurement of a physical quantity which Eve 
cannot determine without revealing that the channel is compromised. Examples for 
these protocols are Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [11] and the noise-based 
secure communication introduced by László Béla Kish in 2005 [12], the Kirchhoff-
Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key exchange protocol examined below. 
The KLJN key exchange system 
The KLJN protocol can provide unconditionally secure communication in an 
elegant and surprisingly simple way by utilizing the thermal noise of resistors. 
Moreover, the security of the protocol is merely based on the laws of classical 
physics [12]. The system consisting only of a few electronic components is simple, 
much less expensive (by a few orders of magnitude) and robust – therefore it 
becomes a promising alternative to quantum cryptography. 
In the KLJN system shown in Figure 1, the the two communicating parties, Alice 
and Bob have an identical pair of resistors (RL, RH, RL≠RH). They are randomly 
connecting one of the resistors to the interconnecting wire on which Eve can 
measure the current (IE(t)) and the voltage (VE(t)) comes from the thermal noise of 
the resistors. The four possible states of the system are represented – taking Alice 
and Bob’s switches in order – as follows: LL LH, HL, HH. 
3 
 
 
Figure 1: Model of KLJN system using noise generators (LH state is shown). 
Due to the thermal noise of the resistors – represented by separate voltage 
generators in the figure – the mean value of the current and voltage noises are zero: 
<IE(t)>=0 and <VE(t)>=0. The power spectral densities and proportional variances 
– which can be calculated from the Kirchhoff-law – are equal in a thermal 
equilibrium in LH and HL states. Eve cannot differentiate between the two states 
due to in the case of normal distribution the expected value and the standar 
deviation defining the measurable current and voltage noises perfectly. Thus, Eve 
cannot deduce which of the two sides has chosen the high or low value resistors. In 
contrast, Alice and Bob can tell the state of the other parties switch knowing the 
state of their own, thus one bit of information can be securely exchanged in LH and 
HL states. 
The classical physical proof of this systems’ unconditional security is based on 
the second law of thermodynamics; in thermal equilibrium there is no energy flow 
between the two parties, thus information cannot be extracted about the state of the 
system. Because there is no energy flow, the P=<VE(t)IE(t)> power on the cable, i.e. 
the correlation of IE(t) and VE(t) becomes zero [12, 13].  
At room temperature the effective value of the current and voltage signals are 
extremely small. With the use of artificial voltage generators however the 
appropriate signal strength can be achieved which corresponds to extremely high 
(109 K) „virtual” temperatures. Ensuring the security of the system requires 
maintaining the mentioned equivalent temperatures on both sides. This can be 
achieved when the variance of the voltage noise for L and H states generated by the 
independent noise generators proportional to the appropriate resistance values. 
During the key exchange Alice and Bob choose resistors randomly for every 
single bit. Afterwards the bits for HH and LL states – i.e. half of the cases – are deleted 
from the key. Alice and Bob can then coordinate the index of bits to be deleted and 
share the results of their measurements on a public authenticated channel to 
prevent active attacks. Next, they can encrypt the information using OTP and share 
with each other using the same channel. According to Kerckhoff’s principle Eve can 
possess all information about the system – including the value of the resistor pairs 
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and effective value of the noise generators – because the unconditional security of 
the system is guaranteed by the fact that she cannot differentiate between LH and 
HL states. 
The ideal KLJN key exchange system – in stationary case – is considered to be 
unconditionally secure; however numerous attacks have been introduced using the 
non-ideal properties that appear in practical realizations. The resistance of the 
interconnecting wires, different temperature of the parties, tolerance of resistor 
values can cause information leak, i.e. Eve can determine the value of the key bit 
with a probability greater than 50% (randomly guessing the value of the bits). The 
outstanding performance and the security of the KLJN system has been 
demonstrated by the first practical realization in Szeged [14] and has inspired the 
development of another secret key exchange method and further protocols. The 
simplicity and flexibility of the system motivated the proposal of many possible 
applications in different environments. 
Requirements of noise properties for unconditional security 
Zoltán Gingl and Róbert Mingesz used an opposite approach to the previous 
investigations; instead of examining the thermal noise based system’s security they 
were investigating what noise properties are required for unconditional security in 
case of artificial noise generators merely with the tools of mathematical statistics 
[15]. Based on their results the necessary condition for security is a stable noise 
distribution – with only the variance of the normal distribution function being finite 
– furthermore the variance of noises have to fulfill the following relationship: 
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These two conditions are in agreement with the criterion from the classical 
physical approach. However, the need might arise to prove mathematically – 
similarly to the Kish’s original proof based on thermodynamics –  that there are 
sufficient conditions for the system’s unconditional security.  
Since Eve can only measure VE(t) és IE(t) the unconditional security of the 
system requires that the two quantities’ statistical parameters and their joint 
distribution are equal in LH and HL states. Using the probability density functions 
of the random variables representing the quantitites (p(IE) és p(VE)) and their joint 
probability density function (h(IE,VE)) the communication is unconditionally secure, 
if:  
1. pLH(IE)=pHL(IE), 
2. pLH(VE)=pHL(VE), 
3. hLH(IE,VE)=hHL(IE,VE). 
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The first two conditions are met with normally distributed noises scaled by 
relationship Eq. (1). To examine condition 3. I have first carried out numerical 
simulations in LabVIEW enviroment. I have analyzed the transmission of a single 
bit, i.e. an LH or HL state to investigate the joint statistics on a scatter plot with 
random number sequences of length 213 [1]; which is significantly more data than 
needed for practical implementations. In the case of normal distribution, the scatter 
plot was only indistinguishable with scaling conforming to Eq. (1). In case of other 
stable distributions and uniform distribution, which is primarily occuring during 
pseudo-random number generation, the joint distribution of LH and HL states were 
distinguishable even with appropriate scaling. Consequently, in the case of 
probability distributions different from normal distribution, though the value of 
correlation and linear regression is zero with correct scaling, the two quantities are 
not independent; their regression function is nonlinear, which shows well the 
special role of normal distribution. 
In our theoretical examination of security we used the fact that condition 3. is 
self-evidently assured if VE and IE are independent, which is consistent with the 
proof of Kish based on thermal equilibrium [13]. 
Based on this and using Lukacs and King’s theorem for the linear combinations 
of independent variables published in 1954 [16], I showed that VE and IE are 
independent if and only if the voltage noises have normal distribution and the 
scaling condition given in Eq. (1) is met. In other words, these two conditions are 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for unconditional security. With this I have 
given a purely mathematical proof leaving out any classical physical considerations 
(but being consistent with those) for the KLJN protocol’s unconditional security [1]. 
Generalization of the KLJN key exchange system 
Linear combination of normal distribution voltage noises, i.e. VE and IE have 
normal distribution as well; which means that these are independent if their 
correlation is zero. I showed that an equal, nonzero correlation in LH and HL states 
is enough – since in case of normally distributed voltage noises the dependency of 
VE and IE is completely determined by their correlation – because this way Eve 
cannot differentiate between the two states [2]. Based on this the 3 conditions for 
unconditional security as defined above can be formulated assuming normal 
distribution as follows: 
1. )()(
2
HL,E
2
LH,E tItI = , 
2. )()(
2
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2
LHE, tVtV = , 
3. )()()()( HLE,HLE,LHE,LHE, tVtItVtI = . 
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Since in the case of the original setup, the correlation in LH and HL states was 
zero in case of noise parameters corresponding to the first two criterion, we have 
examined a more general system in which Alice and Bob are using two-two 
arbitrarily chosen resistors (RLA≠RHA, RLB≠RHB) as shown on Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Model of the generalized KLJN system (in LH state) with four different 
resistors and noise generators with different effective values. 
We can assign four random variables to the four noise generators whose linear 
combinations due to the Kirchoff-laws can be used to describe the measurable 
voltage and current on the communication cable in LH and HL states. Based on these 
the three criteria can be formulated as a function of the resistance values and noise 
generators’ effective values. Solving the equation-system for the given four 
arbitrary resistance values and an arbitrary voltage noise variance, the variances of 
the other three voltage noises can be calculated to meet the conditions for 
unconditional security [2]. 
With this I have shown that the KLJN secure key exchange system provides 
security even under significantly generalized conditions. The resistor pairs used by 
the two parties don’t have to be of equal value, the effective value of the noise 
generators can be selected that the eavesdropper won’t be able to differentiate 
between LH and HL states in any way. I have confirmed this by numerical 
simulations as well; examining different asymmetrical setups for transfer of 106 
bits, the variances of VE(t) and IE(t) were statistically indistinguishable. Studying 
Eve’s bit error rate (BER) did not show any information leakage accordingly [2]. 
These results shed new light on the classical physical interpretation of the 
conditions for KLJN’s unconditional security, since the generalized system is not in 
a thermal equilibrium. Furthermore, the correlation with a nonzero value means 
power flow between the two communicating parties. The original KLJN system in 
which there is no energy transfer is a special – symmetric – case of the generalized 
system. Based on these results Kish reinterpreted the classical physical description 
of the protocol’s security using the fluctuation-dissipation theorem instead of the 
second law of thermodynamics additionally, moreover the results inspired him to 
introduce a new protocol [17]. 
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The generalized system is a major step forward in the practical 
implementation of the protocol since the noise generators can be tune for any value 
of the components to provide perfect security for the communication. 
Generalized KLJN secure key exchange system for practical applications 
For practical applications of the KLJN system the main question is how the 
difference from idealized models during the realization of the system affects its 
security. Accordingly, a significant part of the attacks based on the non-ideality of 
the system. The nonzero cable resistance for example makes it possible for Eve to 
draw conclusions from the voltage drop or from the power flow on the cable. If Alice 
and Bob know Eve’s point of measurement and the value of the cable resistance they 
can modify their noise generators to match the criterion for unconditional security 
based on our previous results. However, in a practical case Eve’s measurement point 
(or points) cannot be known by the two parties, so the question arises: what can 
Alice and Bob do to maintain security?  
To analyze the problem, we have complemented the system as shown on 
Figure 3 with the communication and reference cable’ resistance on which Eve 
makes measurements on q1 és q2 relative observation points. 
 
Figure 3: Model of the generalized KLJN system taking into account the 
communication cable’s RC1 resistance, Eve’s q1 observation point, the reference 
cable’s RC2 resistance and Eve’s q2 observation point in LH state.  
I have used a similar method to determine the criterion for the unconditional 
security of the system complemented with the cable resistance to the one used for 
the generalized system [3]. I have formulated the three conditions required for 
unconditional security, i.e. the equivalence of variances and correlation of VE and IE 
in the function of the variance of the voltage noises, the components’ resistance 
values and the observation point. I have then given the formulas needed to 
determine the three voltage noises’ variances from the above values and one of the 
voltage noise variance by solving the equation-system [3]. These formulas do not 
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contain the observation point, which means that the security is maintained over the 
full length of the interconnecting cable, it doesn’t matter where Eve’s measurement 
point is. I have verified the unconditional security of the system by numerical 
simulations as well [3]. 
Based on the results the correlation of the voltage and current is different at 
different points of the cable, however it can be assured to be equivalent in LH and 
HL states. With this we have interpreted the independence of the compensation 
technique from the point of measurement given by Kish for the original system [18]; 
the correlation is still only zero in the middle of the wire, but the two states are still 
indistinguishable on any other points as well.  
The results are especially important for practical applications, since using the 
original system the components required for implementation have caused 
information leakage, but these components are part of the new system which has 
unconditional security with an appropriate setting of the noise parameters, giving 
general protection from attacks in static case. For that only the exact values of the 
components have to be known.  
The inaccuracy of these values will cause information leakage – the extent of 
which I have examined with numerical simulations [4]. Though the extent of the 
information leakage is dependent on the actual setup, the system proved to be quite 
sensitive to the accuracy of its components’ values. On the other hand, it is more 
insensitive to the inaccuracy of the cable resistance by orders of magnitude. 
Nonetheless, Alice and Bob can modify – even continuously – the effective 
value of their noise generators to eliminate information leakage. For this, only 
measuring the actual values of their communicators’ components is needed, or 
conclusions can be drawn to compensate the errors from voltage and current values 
measured on the wire.  
3 Fluctuation analysis of kayak paddlers’ motion signals 
While investigating periodic processes the fluctuations of the period or another 
quantity characterizing it can carry extra information; variability proved to be a 
useful diagnostic tool in case of periodically moving parts of mechanical machines 
or our heart’s function [19]. Today numerous devices – for example smartphones, 
watches and actigraphs – are able to measure movement with inertial sensors which 
makes it possible to examine the steadiness of our gait or the rhythm of our daily 
activities. 
Sensors of this type are commonly utilized in devices used to help professional 
kayak athletes and coaches, where the goal is the steady repetition of the optimal 
set of movements. The goal in our common project with the EDF DÉMÁSZ Szeged 
Water Sport Association was to develop a measurement system able to track the 
athletes’ performance [9]. During my studies I have observed connection between 
the movement’s steadiness and the technical skills of the athletes, so my focus 
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became to analyze the relationship between the period fluctuations and the quality 
of the paddling in detail. 
Measurement and classification of the motion signals 
The 3-axis acceleration and 3-axis angular velocity signals of the kayaks were 
measured by a special portable instrument developed in our laboratory with a 
sample rate of 1000 Hz – which is much higher than the commercial alternatives [9]. 
An athlete’s current performance can be influenced by numerous factors, 
therefore, to ensure that the performances to be compared are recorded under the 
most similar circumstances possible, I have examined the first 10 minutes of long 
range (>5 km) training paddlings of 14 athletes with different age and technical 
skills. 
I have analyzed the indicators as a function of the athletes’ technical skills with 
the assumption that they were paddling with average performance and a technical 
implementation appropriate for their preparedness. For the quantitative 
description of this, I used the athletes’ age and classification done by the trainer in 
the scale: 1-10. 
The fluctuation-based indicators were calculated (both in the time and 
frequency domain) for a 30 second time window of the signals, of which 10 minute 
averages were used for the comparison.  
Temporal and spectral fluctuation analysis of motion signals  
The accurate spatial reconstruction of the motion is not possible from the 
measured signals thus we can gather information about the athletes’ paddling by 
the detection of the motion signals’ period and the study of their shape [20, 21]. The 
most important classical parameters characterising a paddling cycle are the period, 
the stroke rate calculated from the previous value and the stroke impulse specific of 
the pulling – calculated by integration of the positive part of the acceleration signal.  
I have shown with statistical analysis of the quantities characterising the 
period of the paddling, that the degree of their fluctuation is connected to the 
athletes’ technical skills, which is observable on Figure 4. The phenomenon is well 
described by the trend curves and the Poincaré plot representation of the 
quantities; the indicators of a beginner athlete are fluctuating much more than in 
the case of a professional athlete [5]. This fluctuation can be interpreted by the fact 
that steady paddling is required for the optimal movement of the kayak. 
At the same time numerous questions arise about the determination of the 
standard deviation describing these fluctuations; should we normalize it with the 
mean of the quantities or does the trends in the changing of the quantities influence 
these values? These questions were examined by calculating the correlation 
between the different indicators and the technical level or the age of the athlete. Our 
studies were based on the periodicity of the kayak’s motion, which period seems to 
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be a single paddling based on the forward axis acceleration signal, however the total 
period of the movement is combined from a right and a left hand paddling stroke 
because of the paddlings’ asymmetry. This was confirmed by my results as well: all 
standard deviation based indicators were showing a stronger correlation between 
the quantities describing the two-handed time period and the technical level [6]. 
 
Figure 4: The relative standard deviation of the two-handed stroke impulse as a 
function of of the technical skill’s classification (left) and the athlete’s age (right). 
The presented variability analysis requires the detection of the strokes which 
can be quite difficult case of complex signal shapes – for example when technical 
fault occures or at sprint race. I have examined if this information can be recovered 
from the raw signals without detecting the stroke periods, since this way the usage 
of the complex and computationally intensive detection algorithms could be 
eliminated, and our results would not be affected by their reliability and accuracy. 
The steadiness of the motion can be analyzed in frequency-domain as well, 
because the periodic components of the movement can be separated from the other 
signal components using the frequency determined by the stroke period, and the 
ratio of their power can be characterized by the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). A further 
advantage of the method is that we do not have to exclusively rely on the forward 
axis acceleration signal, we can calculate our indicators on all six motion signals. 
The basic question for determining the spectral indicators based on the SNR is 
how we can separate the “signal” and the “noise”. While defining the power of the 
periodic components, the identification of the fundamental frequency is not clear 
either in case of the determination of the peaks taken into account in the power 
spectral density. The period of the forward and vertical axis acceleration and the 
pitch axis angular velocity signals is seemingly independent of the hand in 
execution, in this case the the dominant frequency of the spectra is the first 
harmonic that belongs to the one hand stroke cycle, while the dominant frequency 
of the horizontal axis acceleration, the yaw and roll axis angular velocity belongs to 
the fundamental frequency identified by to the whole period of both hands strokes. 
The shape of a single period of the motion signals determines the number of 
the harmonic peaks emerges significantly form the noise level in the power spectral 
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density, though its power – for example in case of a technical fault – does not belong 
to the optimal components of the motion exclusively. I have compared the signal 
and noise power and the SNR calculated by taking into account different numbers 
of harmonics using the coefficient of determination between these indicators and 
technical skills. Since the correct determination of the harmonic peak’s power is not 
clear I have examined the effect of several similar numerical methods – fixed peak 
width or using estimated half-width, frequency dependent peak width and the use 
of Hanning- or rectangular spectral window – as well [6]. 
The connection between the SNR in case of the roll axis angular velocity and 
the athletes’ age or technical skills can be observed well on Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of roll axis angular velocity as a function of 
technical skills’ classification (left) and of athletes age (right). 
Based on these results the indicators calculated from the yaw and roll axis 
angular velocity signals showed the strongest correlation with the paddling quality, 
which means the paddling is better characterized by the two hands spectral 
indicators, as previously seen in the case of the temporal indicators [6].  
This novel approach based on fluctuation analysis – which seems to be suitable 
for measuring quality of technique – raises interesting questions: what are the 
sources of these fluctuations, to what extent is the fluctuation dependent on the 
technique and the technical faults, external mechanical effects or the physical and 
mental state of the athlete? What further indicators could characterize the technical 
execution? 
Examination of period fluctuations could be advantageous in case of analyzing 
other sports or periodic motions, performance estimation or diagnosing health 
parameters. The connection between temporal and spectral indicators 
characterizing the period fluctuations can be studied further with analytical and 
numerical methods as well. The indicators of spectral variability analysis based on 
SNR could be useful for numerous other periodic – e.g. physiological – signals 
because of the elimination peak detection in time domain, thus this approach is the 
subject of our current research. 
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4 Thesis statements 
My new scientific results in the application of random fluctuations presented in the 
dissertation are summarized in the four thesis statements below. The supporting 
publications were referenced at the end of each statement. The first three points 
describe my results in the field of noise-based unconditionally secure 
communication. These were published in three international journal articles and an 
international conference article. The fourth point summarizes my results in 
evaluating kayak paddlers’ performance by fluctuation analysis of the periodic 
motion signals, which were published in an international journal article (based on 
an invited talk) and an international conference article. The type of the supporting 
publications and their connection with the thesis statements are shown in Table 1. 
Thesis 
state-
ment 
Publications 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Journal 
Q3 
IF=0,811 
Journal 
Q1 
IF=5,228 
Journal 
Q1 
IF=3,244 
Conference Conference 
Journal 
Q1 
IF=2,196 
1. ∎      
2.  ∎     
3.   ∎ ∎   
4.     ∎ ∎ 
Table 1: The connection between the supporting publications and the thesis 
statements summarizing the new scientific results presented in the dissertation. In 
the case of journals, their impact factor and Web of Science ranking are also noted. 
1. Proof of the noise requirements for unconditionally secure communication 
with the KLJN secure key exchange system  
According to the earlier results of the KLJN protocol’s examination with 
mathematical statistical tools the necessary conditions for unconditionally secure 
communication – in agreement with the results of the classical physical approach – 
are that noise generators produce normally distributed voltage noises whose 
variances are scaled with the ratio of the resistances. We have complemented the 
analysis with the examination of the joint probability distributions of the voltage 
and current noise measured by the eavesdropper. First, I demonstrated by 
numerical simulation of the system that the LH and HL states assigned to the 0 and 
1 key bits are distinguishable making the exchange insecure in cases with the two 
above conditions unmet. Then I showed using the theorem regarding the 
independence of the linear combination of two independent random variables that 
the two requirements of the noise parameters are necessary and sufficient for the 
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unconditional security of the protocol. With this I have given the mathematical proof 
of the protocol’s security without classical physical considerations. [1] 
2.  Generalization of the KLJN key exchange protocol 
The original protocol requires the two communicating parties to use the same 
resistor pairs basing the security on the independence of the quantities measurable 
by the eavesdropper. I showed that the indistinguishability of the LH and HL states 
can be ensured with significantly less limitations. The independence of the current 
and voltage noises is not required, it is enough that their joint distributions are 
equal in the two cases. Based on this I showed that the condition for unconditional 
security in the case of normally distributed voltage noises is the equality of the 
variances and correlation of the measurable current and voltage noises in the LH 
and HL states. This can be accomplished with a much more general system in which 
the two parties are using two different sets of resistor pairs. I gave the formulas for 
the effective values of the noise generators based on the new criteria which make 
the generalized system unconditionally secure. I have verified these results by 
numerical simulations as well. The original KLJN system corresponds to the 
symmetrical case in which the two quantities measurable by the eavesdropper do 
not correlate, i.e. there is no power flow between the two parties, the system is in a 
thermal equilibrium. I showed by the generalization of the protocol that this 
condition is not necessary to achieve unconditional security. This resulted in the 
reinterpretation of the classical physical description of the KLJN protocol’s security 
and the introduction of new protocols. The new key exchange protocol in which the 
two communicating parties’ system does not have to be equivalent simplifies the 
hardware’s realization and practical implementation greatly. [2] 
3.  Generalized KLJN key exchange for practical applications 
We complemented the model of the generalized KLJN system with the 
communication wire’s resistance on which the eavesdropper can make 
measurements at any position. I showed that the conditions guaranteeing the 
unconditional security (used in the 2. point) can be satisfied in this system as well. 
I gave the equations for the variance of the voltage noises, which show that the noise 
generators’ required effective values do not depend on the observation point of the 
eavesdropper. The security is maintained over the full length of the interconnecting 
cable; the correlation of the voltage and current is different at different points of the 
cable, however it can be assured to be equivalent in LH and HL states. In the original 
system deviation from the ideal case – resistance of the wire and other components 
necessary for practical implementation – resulted in information leakage. In 
contrast these components are part of the new system in the ideal case as well which 
is unconditionally secure if the noise parameters are correctly set, providing general 
protection against attacks in static case. Therefore, this protocol, which is capable 
of completely detecting and compensating errors caused by components of real 
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physical systems even in real time, simplifies and facilitates the practical application 
of the method. I have verified the security of the system by numerical simulation as 
well. Furthermore, I investigated the extent of information leakage caused by the 
tolerance of the components used in the real physical implementation. [3, 4] 
4.  Performance estimation of kayak paddlers based on fluctuation analysis of 
movement signals 
While analyzing the performance of kayak paddlers through the movement 
signals of the kayak I showed that the quality of the paddling is correlated to the 
fluctuations of the period and stroke impulse, which characterise the period of the 
motion. This means that indicators of that fluctuation – based on temporal 
variability or the signal-to-noise ratio calculated from the power spectra of the raw 
movement signals– could contain additional information. 
I showed by plotting the temporal change of the classical parameters 
characterizing the period of the motion signals on trend curves and Poincaré plots 
that their fluctuations are connected to the technical skills of the athletes. For the 
examination of this connection I compared multiple indicators – based on the 
standard deviation of the stroke period and stroke impulse – and the numerical 
methods required for determining them. The strongest correlation was shown by 
the relative standard deviation of the stroke period’s stroke impulse while paddlers 
were pulling with both hands. 
I introduced a method based on the signal-to-noise ratio calculated from the 
power spectral density of the raw motion signals. The benefits of this method are 
that the peak detection in time domain can be eliminated, and that it allows the 
fluctuation analysis of the other acceleration and angular velocity signals besides 
the use of the forward axis acceleration signal. I compared different signal and noise 
separation methods and multiple numerical procedures for determining them for 
each of the six movement signals. There was a much stronger correlation in the case 
of the signals when the athletes were pulling with both hands. 
A connection was shown between the technical skills and the period 
fluctuations based on the correlation of the indicators and the age and classification 
of the 14 paddlers with different age and different levels of training. Our results 
raise a number of interesting, open questions which could be the subject of further 
research. The approach could be applied to other periodic movements and the 
presented method of spectral variability analysis might also include new results for 
other periodic – eg. physiological – signals. [5, 6] 
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